Speakers
Synopsis
Many key agencies and frameworks consider the concept of “Cyber War” to be restricted to the digital sphere. State sponsored cyber-attacks actions such as those undertaken by Volt Typhoon are a prime example. Australian Defence Force (ADF) cyber capabilities currently focus on defensive Assessment and Authorisation to understand and mitigate risk in addition to Incident Response. However, current global events have demonstrated that the integration of cyber with kinetic activities has the ability to significantly influence battlefield outcomes.
When we consider cyber as a Battlespace Operating System, cyber has the capability to integrate and support not only C2 and ISR, but also a range of others. This presentations aims to examine contemporary cyber capabilities utilised in support of kinetic operations that could be integrated into military operations, their use cases, and potential considerations for integration into the ADF capability suite.
Such capability integration has been demonstrated in a range of scenarios such as the attack on the Viasat satellite network preceding the Russian invasion of Ukraine and Ukrainian Security Service's (SBU) cyber department’s frontline intelligence gathering.
The potential for cyber to be utilised within battlefield operations has been demonstrated both theoretically and practically in use cases such as:
- Collection of Mobile Advertising Identifier data to facilitate geolocation of mobile devices
- Compromise of unsecured devices through Shodan searches to gather information on adversary dispositions
- Provision of instructions and tooling for frontline units to gather data from captured devices
The Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) focuses on the utilisation of offensive cyber capabilities against a range of adversaries to protect Australians and Australia’s national interests, they are predominantly targeted at the strategic level. Whilst ASD’s capabilities are certainly capable of conducting strategic actions in support of the ADF, more consideration needs to be given into how cyber can better integrate at the tactical level either supporting or being conducted alongside kinetic actions. The ADF’s recent move in establishing a Cyber Command within Joint Capabilities Group is a positive move in the right direction. However consideration needs to be given into the development of offensive cyber capabilities that have the ability to support tactical objectives in place of the strategic similar to that of the US Cyber Combat Mission Teams.
The US Cyber Command contains a Cyber National Mission Force has included Cyber Combat Mission Teams within their Order of Battle, tasked with the conduct of military cyber operations in support of combatant commands. This is a model that should be considered for duplication within the ADF.
Warfighting technology and platforms are increasingly reliant on interconnected networks resulting in a need to implement cyber security capabilities from the supply chain to the fighting pit. The appropriate development, integration and application of cyber capabilities across the entirety of the warfighting spectrum will be critical in ensuring that Australia has not only the strategic ability to counter large Nation State backed operations, but the ability to ensure that our Warfighters have every tactical advantage to enable mission success.
